Wednesday, July 28, 2010
Wednesday, July 14, 2010
Thursday, June 10, 2010
Friday, June 4, 2010
Tuesday, June 1, 2010
Euro External Demand
Here is one link.
The Role of External Demand in the Eurozone
by Jacob Funk Kirkegaard | May 27th, 2010 | 03:20 pm
The argument is widely heard in Europe and elsewhere: If only Greece and other struggling eurozone countries could let their currency depreciate, as other collapsing economies have done when hit by debt crises—in Asia and Latin America, for example. Such a step would in theory boost demand for these countries’ exports, limit their imports, and make it easier to lower their debts.
Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and other European countries wedded to the euro can’t take that step, of course, without suffering a major disruption. But the view that a currency devaluation would offer a way out for Greece or other countries is in any case based on a simple fallacy. Just because eurozone members share their currency, the euro, with their eurozone neighbors does not prevent them from benefiting from the increased external demand for their goods driven by a decline in the euro itself.
Here is another:
Challenges for the Euro Area, and the World Economy
Speech by Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB
at “The Group of Thirty”, 63rd Plenary Session, Session I: The Crisis of the Eurosystem,
Rabat, 28 May 2010
It is a pleasure to be here today, in the Group of Thirty, to discuss the main challenges on the road to a sustained recovery. I actually ask myself whether the title of the first session – “Crisis of the Eurosystem” – adequately reflects what is happening in Europe and more generally in the global financial markets. My impression is that what we are now seeing primarily in the euro area reflects a broader phenomenon, namely the sustainability of public finances in advanced economies. To repeat a much used metaphor recently, we could say that euro area tensions are “the canary in the coal mine” of the challenges that policy-makers worldwide are going to face.
Let me elaborate by looking at the origin of the problem, i.e. the sustainability of public finances. In the aftermath of the Lehman failure, governments around the world seemed to rediscover Keynes. They injected huge amounts of borrowed money – public funds – to stabilise the economy after the shock of the Lehman failure. These policies worked, and averted a global depression. The success of those policies has led governments – encouraged by international organisations – to continue using expansionary fiscal policies to try pulling the economy out of the recession and getting it back to the pre-crisis level.
Here is another:
Germany vs. Europe (New York Times Editorial)
Published: May 26, 2010
Germany’s commitment to the European Union has been central to its postwar rehabilitation and its economic success. For years, Germany played the role in Europe that America so frequently plays globally — the locomotive whose dynamism and demand helps turn around recessions before they deepen into depressions.
Here is another:
The end of EMU: How Germany might leave
Julian D. A. Wiseman
Abstract: A country in the eurozone can, without being in breach of the Maastricht Treaty, create a new central bank controlling the monetary policy of a new currency. This loophole in the Maastricht Treaty is not widely known.
Here is another:
The PIGS’ external debt problem
Ricardo Cabral
8 May 2010
Markets are increasingly concerned that the Greek debt crisis could spread to other Eurozone countries including Portugal, Ireland, and Spain. This column notes that much of these countries' debt is held by non-residents meaning that the governments do not receive tax revenue on the interest paid, nor does the interest payment itself remain in the country. The solution lies with debt restructuring and rescheduling.
Financial markets are focused on the public finances of Portugal, Ireland, Greece, and Spain (the “PIGS”). The PIGS´ public profligacy is partly to blame for their current plight, but other factors are at play. Amid the hype, little attention is paid to the crucial difference between these nations’ public debt and their external debt.
* Debt held by a nation’s own citizens has less pernicious consequences (Scott 2010) – the interest paid is returned to the domestic economy.
* External debt, if used to finance non-productive expenditure, is a different matter. Non-residents receive the interest on such debt, making the nation poorer with every interest payment.
Rift in the ECB:
ECB FOCUS-Deepening rift hampers ECB public opinion battle
* Deepening split at ECB hampers efforts to sell bond buys
Bonds
* Weber opposition "like blaspheming in public"
* Conspiracy theories developing along national lines
By Krista Hughes, Chief ECB Correspondent
FRANKFURT, June 1 (Reuters) - A deepening split at the top of the European Central Bank is undermining efforts to convince the public of the merits of buying government bonds and could suck the ECB further into the murky waters of European politics.
Axel Weber, head of the German Bundesbank, has made no secret of his objections to a policy designed to calm nervous markets and help stabilise the euro, but which he contends could fuel inflation.
He went a step further on Monday by calling for a strict cap on the programme, so far open-ended, which entails buying debt of weaker south European economies such as Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy on the secondary market. [ID:nLDE64U16A]
And one on Merkel's leadership:
German leader Merkel goes from glories to disgrace
BERLIN – It was only nine months ago that Forbes magazine named German Chancellor Angela Merkel the world's most powerful woman for the fourth year in a row.
She impressed Germans and foreigners alike with her ascent to power — an East German pastor's daughter who took control of the male-dominated conservative party and won elections in Europe's economic powerhouse, becoming Germany's first female chancellor in 2005.
She was lauded for hosting the world's top leaders at the G-8 summit in Heiligendamm in 2007 with ease and professionalism. She repaired relations with the United States that were strained over the Iraq war, and she positioned herself as a political heavyweight on the continent. It seemed that no major political and economic decision could be made in Europe without Merkel's approval.
Resignation of Köhler is blow to Merkel's fragile coalition
By Gerrit Wiesmann in Berlin
Published: June 1 2010 03:00 | Last updated: June 1 2010 03:00
Horst Köhler, Germany's president, added to the pressure on chancellor Angela Merkel yesterday when he resigned over his contentious remarks that the country's military effort in Afghanistan protected German commercial interests.
The resignation - the first of its kind in modern Germany - came after his comments drew widespread criticism in a largely pacifist country wary of the return of martial traits.
Although the presidency is a ceremonial role, the search for a replacement will test Ms Merkel, who is already fighting to keep her fractious coalition of Christian Democrats and Free Democrats on side over the euro rescue and austerity measures.
The task comes as her Christian Democrats wrestle to stay in power in the big state of North Rhine-Westphalia, and cast about for a new lion on the party's right flank after Hesse governor Roland Koch quit unexpectedly.
Ms Merkel conceded she had been "surprised" by Mr Köhler's decision. "He was an important counsellor," she said. "It is his counsel I will now miss."
Despite the slim majority for the ruling parties in the presidential electoral college, Ms Merkel said in an interview on ARD and ZDF television last night that her coalition would propose a new president, according to Bloomberg.
Ms Merkel's success in placing Mr Köhler in Germany's highest office six years ago was a harbinger of the political change that followed in late 2005, when she ousted the Social Democrat Gerhard Schröder as chancellor. The same symbolism will dog the vote in the electoral college in June - any alliance of Ms Merkel's Christian Democrats with the Social Democrats would be another blow.
Mr Köhler, once head of the International Monetary Fund, said he was resigning after "unfounded" criticism of his remarks about the need for German soldiers overseas undermined "the necessary respect for my office".
Opposition politicians last week attacked him unusually bluntly after he said the task of "stopping regional instabilities" was vital for Germany because it would bring "free trade routes" and "jobs and income through trade".
The circumstances of his departure served to remind that Mr Köhler was a head of state who had never found his role. A series of staff defections in past months had suggested all was not well in the president's office.
Mr Köhler lacked the warmth of some predecessors. He spent most of his career as a bureaucrat, rising to become deputy finance minister for international affairs under Helmut Kohl before being nominated by Mr Schröder, to take charge of the IMF.
The Role of External Demand in the Eurozone
by Jacob Funk Kirkegaard | May 27th, 2010 | 03:20 pm
The argument is widely heard in Europe and elsewhere: If only Greece and other struggling eurozone countries could let their currency depreciate, as other collapsing economies have done when hit by debt crises—in Asia and Latin America, for example. Such a step would in theory boost demand for these countries’ exports, limit their imports, and make it easier to lower their debts.
Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and other European countries wedded to the euro can’t take that step, of course, without suffering a major disruption. But the view that a currency devaluation would offer a way out for Greece or other countries is in any case based on a simple fallacy. Just because eurozone members share their currency, the euro, with their eurozone neighbors does not prevent them from benefiting from the increased external demand for their goods driven by a decline in the euro itself.
Here is another:
Challenges for the Euro Area, and the World Economy
Speech by Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB
at “The Group of Thirty”, 63rd Plenary Session, Session I: The Crisis of the Eurosystem,
Rabat, 28 May 2010
It is a pleasure to be here today, in the Group of Thirty, to discuss the main challenges on the road to a sustained recovery. I actually ask myself whether the title of the first session – “Crisis of the Eurosystem” – adequately reflects what is happening in Europe and more generally in the global financial markets. My impression is that what we are now seeing primarily in the euro area reflects a broader phenomenon, namely the sustainability of public finances in advanced economies. To repeat a much used metaphor recently, we could say that euro area tensions are “the canary in the coal mine” of the challenges that policy-makers worldwide are going to face.
Let me elaborate by looking at the origin of the problem, i.e. the sustainability of public finances. In the aftermath of the Lehman failure, governments around the world seemed to rediscover Keynes. They injected huge amounts of borrowed money – public funds – to stabilise the economy after the shock of the Lehman failure. These policies worked, and averted a global depression. The success of those policies has led governments – encouraged by international organisations – to continue using expansionary fiscal policies to try pulling the economy out of the recession and getting it back to the pre-crisis level.
Here is another:
Germany vs. Europe (New York Times Editorial)
Published: May 26, 2010
Germany’s commitment to the European Union has been central to its postwar rehabilitation and its economic success. For years, Germany played the role in Europe that America so frequently plays globally — the locomotive whose dynamism and demand helps turn around recessions before they deepen into depressions.
Here is another:
The end of EMU: How Germany might leave
Julian D. A. Wiseman
Abstract: A country in the eurozone can, without being in breach of the Maastricht Treaty, create a new central bank controlling the monetary policy of a new currency. This loophole in the Maastricht Treaty is not widely known.
Here is another:
The PIGS’ external debt problem
Ricardo Cabral
8 May 2010
Markets are increasingly concerned that the Greek debt crisis could spread to other Eurozone countries including Portugal, Ireland, and Spain. This column notes that much of these countries' debt is held by non-residents meaning that the governments do not receive tax revenue on the interest paid, nor does the interest payment itself remain in the country. The solution lies with debt restructuring and rescheduling.
Financial markets are focused on the public finances of Portugal, Ireland, Greece, and Spain (the “PIGS”). The PIGS´ public profligacy is partly to blame for their current plight, but other factors are at play. Amid the hype, little attention is paid to the crucial difference between these nations’ public debt and their external debt.
* Debt held by a nation’s own citizens has less pernicious consequences (Scott 2010) – the interest paid is returned to the domestic economy.
* External debt, if used to finance non-productive expenditure, is a different matter. Non-residents receive the interest on such debt, making the nation poorer with every interest payment.
Rift in the ECB:
ECB FOCUS-Deepening rift hampers ECB public opinion battle
* Deepening split at ECB hampers efforts to sell bond buys
Bonds
* Weber opposition "like blaspheming in public"
* Conspiracy theories developing along national lines
By Krista Hughes, Chief ECB Correspondent
FRANKFURT, June 1 (Reuters) - A deepening split at the top of the European Central Bank is undermining efforts to convince the public of the merits of buying government bonds and could suck the ECB further into the murky waters of European politics.
Axel Weber, head of the German Bundesbank, has made no secret of his objections to a policy designed to calm nervous markets and help stabilise the euro, but which he contends could fuel inflation.
He went a step further on Monday by calling for a strict cap on the programme, so far open-ended, which entails buying debt of weaker south European economies such as Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy on the secondary market. [ID:nLDE64U16A]
And one on Merkel's leadership:
German leader Merkel goes from glories to disgrace
BERLIN – It was only nine months ago that Forbes magazine named German Chancellor Angela Merkel the world's most powerful woman for the fourth year in a row.
She impressed Germans and foreigners alike with her ascent to power — an East German pastor's daughter who took control of the male-dominated conservative party and won elections in Europe's economic powerhouse, becoming Germany's first female chancellor in 2005.
She was lauded for hosting the world's top leaders at the G-8 summit in Heiligendamm in 2007 with ease and professionalism. She repaired relations with the United States that were strained over the Iraq war, and she positioned herself as a political heavyweight on the continent. It seemed that no major political and economic decision could be made in Europe without Merkel's approval.
Resignation of Köhler is blow to Merkel's fragile coalition
By Gerrit Wiesmann in Berlin
Published: June 1 2010 03:00 | Last updated: June 1 2010 03:00
Horst Köhler, Germany's president, added to the pressure on chancellor Angela Merkel yesterday when he resigned over his contentious remarks that the country's military effort in Afghanistan protected German commercial interests.
The resignation - the first of its kind in modern Germany - came after his comments drew widespread criticism in a largely pacifist country wary of the return of martial traits.
Although the presidency is a ceremonial role, the search for a replacement will test Ms Merkel, who is already fighting to keep her fractious coalition of Christian Democrats and Free Democrats on side over the euro rescue and austerity measures.
The task comes as her Christian Democrats wrestle to stay in power in the big state of North Rhine-Westphalia, and cast about for a new lion on the party's right flank after Hesse governor Roland Koch quit unexpectedly.
Ms Merkel conceded she had been "surprised" by Mr Köhler's decision. "He was an important counsellor," she said. "It is his counsel I will now miss."
Despite the slim majority for the ruling parties in the presidential electoral college, Ms Merkel said in an interview on ARD and ZDF television last night that her coalition would propose a new president, according to Bloomberg.
Ms Merkel's success in placing Mr Köhler in Germany's highest office six years ago was a harbinger of the political change that followed in late 2005, when she ousted the Social Democrat Gerhard Schröder as chancellor. The same symbolism will dog the vote in the electoral college in June - any alliance of Ms Merkel's Christian Democrats with the Social Democrats would be another blow.
Mr Köhler, once head of the International Monetary Fund, said he was resigning after "unfounded" criticism of his remarks about the need for German soldiers overseas undermined "the necessary respect for my office".
Opposition politicians last week attacked him unusually bluntly after he said the task of "stopping regional instabilities" was vital for Germany because it would bring "free trade routes" and "jobs and income through trade".
The circumstances of his departure served to remind that Mr Köhler was a head of state who had never found his role. A series of staff defections in past months had suggested all was not well in the president's office.
Mr Köhler lacked the warmth of some predecessors. He spent most of his career as a bureaucrat, rising to become deputy finance minister for international affairs under Helmut Kohl before being nominated by Mr Schröder, to take charge of the IMF.
Saturday, May 29, 2010
Whither Spain – Towards Finland or Argentina?
Well, here I am spending my last day in Sitges, attending the annual meeting of the Circulo de Economía (which is why I have been so silent). The annual meet up tends to attract many leading participants in Spanish economic and financial life. I have been here since Thursday, and gave a presentation on the need for som...e sort of internal devaluation. As Alfredo Pastor (who introduced me) said, what Edward was arguing six months ago seemed to be "catastrophist", now it has become the consensus.
Interestingly, Dani Roderik, who spoke yesterday, came to very similar conclusions: Spain's needs a 20 % internal devaluation (or in his opinion should leave the Eurozone - I don't agree with this part). Keeping ahead of the curve, I am now starting to argue - as previewed in my latest AFOE post - that either we move soon on this, or Germany will inevitably have to go back (temporarily) to the Mark. The system won't hold otherwise. Given that opinions have changed so radically here in Spain in just six months, nothing can be ruled out at this point.
Not even Zapatero stepping down. It is interesting to note that CiU gave him till the end of the year - he will not be able to pass a budget for 2011 - to do this, or there will be elections. So let's see if the leaders of PSOE are able to "factor in" what will inevitably happen, and take a decision now.
Spain does not need elections. Spain needs a change at the top, a consensus government supported by all the main parties, and a swift internal devaluation.
Interestingly a lot of people have spoken to me here over the last few days, and all the comments have been positive. Many of the people here seem to read me in La Vaguardia (Dinero supplement) on Sundays. I never realised I was so popular, in fact I had quite the opposite impression.
Below you will find the English version of my press release. I entitled my presentation "Spain - Finland or Argentina". I think the reason for this should be fairly clear. Back in the early 1990s, following an uncontrolled credit boom, Finland underwent a deep depression as its GDP dropped by around 14% and unemployment rose dramatically from 3 to almost 20%. Initially the Finish government refused to recognise the severity of the situation, and the economy failed to recover. Then they took the “bull by the horns”, carried out a series of deep structural reforms and as a result the country is now widely recognised as a model of flexibility and good practice.
The other path is to do very little, live in hope, and expect the worst. This is the road to ruin and decay. The Argentine path.
The Finnish case was of course a little different from the situation Spain now faces, since Finland had its own currency, and was thus able to restore competitiveness through a substantial devaluation, a devaluation which then required the creation of a bad bank to relieve lenders of toxic assets produced by the rapid rise in non perforing foreign currency loans.
To many in Spain this kind of radical price and wage adjustment proposal is simply unrealistic. But at this point there are few remaining alternatives. Spain is gradually replacing Greece as the focus of global investor concern, and while people in Spain may have little appetite for such drastic changes, they should never forget that across in Germany, where people are now being asked to authorise funding for substantial loans to be used on Europe’s periphery, support for proposals that the country return to the Deutsche Mark is growing by the day. As the IMF point out, any comprehensive strategy to move the Spansih train along the track which leads to the Finland station requires broad political and social support, while time is of the essence.
Spain - Finland or Argentina?
Following a decade long housing “boom” Spain now has an enormous debt problem. The combined debt level of Spain’s households, companies and government now amounts to some 265% of GDP.
However, in contrast to the situation in countries like Greece and Italy, Spain’s endebtedness problem is not principally one of massive public sector debt. The main component of Spanish debt is private – between households and companies accumulated debt amounts to some 210% of GDP.
Spain is not, by a long stretch, the only country to suffer from such a high level of private indebtedness. There is, for instance, the example of the United States, where total indebtedness now significantly exceeds the 300% of GDP level, a threshold which many consider to be highly structurally significant. The sheer fact of knowing you share this problem with other larger, and richer, countries may be soothing, but it should also give an indication of the kinds of difficulty Spain may experience in interacting with the external environment, since solutions will need to be found which fit the needs not of one isolated country, but of various countries, all at one and the same time.
Stabilisation....But At A Price
After an extremely severe recession the Spanish economy has now been stabilised.
Industrial output has stopped falling, and retail sales have even started to rise slightly.
Output in the bloated construction sector, as was to be expected, continues to fall, as do house prices. Unemployment has stopped rising, although employment, and participation in the Social Security system continues to fall.
At the same time the previously large migration flows have now all but dried up.
But this stabilisation comes at a price, given that is the result of a dramatic surge in current government spending and a huge liquidity support operation for the financial system being supplied by the ECB.
Deficit and Debt Dynamics
As is by now well known, this increase in public spending has produced a further problem – one of a large government fiscal deficit – and this development has served to attract the attention of the international investors on whom Spain depends for its financing at precisely the time that the issue of sovereign debt in the ageing societies of the economically developed world is starting to become a cause for concern in the financial markets.
The principal difficulty facing the Spanish economy at the present time is that while the emergency measures have served to buy time, this time has not been wisely employed, and the measures have simply served to exaccerbate the underlying structural problems rather than resolve them.
According to the National Statistics Office (INE), the slight economic expansion that was achieved in the first quarter of 2010 (0.1% growth) was the combined result of an increase in internal demand and a worsening of the net impact of external demand – precisely the opposite of what you would want to achieve. In other words, while Spain’s exports did increase, the growth in domestic demand in conditions of limited international competitiveness meant that imports increased even more. On an interannual basis the negative impact of national demand reduced (from -5.3 percentage points to -2.5 percentage points – see chart below) while the positive impact of external demand fell (from 2.2 percentage points to 1.2 percentage points). To be clear, growth in the first quarter of 2010 was due to rising domestic demand, and not rising exports, which means the real impact of the increase in government spending and the liquidity measures applied by the ECB since June 2009 has been to reverse the positive trend in the goods trade deficit which had been seen in earlier quarters.
As the Spanish government stresses, the country’s share in world exports has remained more or less constant since the start of the century, but at the same time Spain’s share of world imports has increased. Put another way, thanks to the foreign funds which flowed in to finance the housing boom Spain became a major imports powerhouse, with the consequence that both the trade and the current account deficits deteriorated sharply, while a significant part of Spanish industry simple died. One of the major tasks of any recovery programme is to bring this industry back to life. In this sense what Spain’s economy needs is not rejuvenation but resurrection.
With a highly integrated global economy as the background, Spain’s seemingly insatiable demand to build and buy ever more housing units was satisfied via the massive entry of migrant labour (5 million immigrants in 10 years), and substantial ongoing capital inflows (a current account deficit of around 10% of GDP), which both served to raise the short term capacity of the economy, but lead to the consequence that Spain today is a highly over-indebted country – net external debt is around 90% of GDP – while a large part of the manufacturing base which would have facilitated paying down the debt now no longer exists.
As a result – and as Mr Zapatero repeatedly stresses – it is the case that the accumulated debt of the Spanish government is not (yet) inordinately large when compared to that of its peers, although as a share of GDP it has been increasing rapidly in recent quarters.
To reduce this debt burden the Spanish economy needs two things: inflation and growth, although it should be stressed that competitiveness can only be restored by some form of price and wage deflation.
In a modern, mature, economy growth in aggregate demand only comes either via an increase in the level of credit, or through an increase in exports. The problem that Spain faces is that, on the one hand all sectors of the economy (households, companies and government) are now heavily over-endebted and deleveraging as fast as they can, with the result that – on aggregate – they are demanding less (not more) credit. On the other hand, the Spanish economy is not sufficiently competitive to be able to grow simply by relying on exports.
In addition, systematic dependency on external financing is never a good thing, since your creditors can always impose conditions on you which may not be to your liking. Despite the fact that the commitment to reduce Spain’s fiscal deficit by 5% of GDP in 2 years is, in and of itself, a very strong one, the country actually has to make a far greater fiscal effort than it seems, due to the commitment contained in the recent Ley de Economía Sostenible to reduce substantially the quantity of unpaid receiveables on the public sector account books. Spain’s Autonomous Communities alone have some 30 billion (or around 3% of GDP ) in payments oustanding as of the last quarter of 2010 – which means there will need to be a reduction in spending of something like a additional 1% of GDP a year over the adjustment period under this heading alone.
The need to restore order to Spain’s public finances will mean that the adjustment will be even more painful than generally envisaged, and that the impact of the correction on the economy generally will be more severe. Thus, it is rather unlikely that the Spanish economy will grow in 2011 as many expect. Weighed down by a heavy fiscal correction, an unacceptably high level of unemployment, private demand in slight contraction and a weak growth rate in exports, it is probable that the economy will once more contract, possibly by between 1% and 2%.
To conclude, Spain stands at a crossroads, and important decisions need to be taken. A fiscal adjustment is necessary, but the country also needs a competitiveness adjustment in the form of a substantial reduction in the wage and price level (possibly by 20%). If this is not implemented the dynamic of Spain’s debt will surely become unsustainable. Spain has two – and only – choices at this point. It can follow Finland’s example in the 1990s, take the bull by the horns and use the present crisis as an opportunity to transform the Spanish economy into a new economic miracle, or it can remain in denial about the severity of the problem, let things drift until they can do so no longer, and then follow Argentina down the road of ruin and despair.
To cite the words of the latest IMF report: “Such a comprehensive strategy would be helped by broad political and social support, and time is of the essence.” Ladies and gentlemen, enough is enough. Nearly three years have now been wasted, and it is time to act.
Interestingly, Dani Roderik, who spoke yesterday, came to very similar conclusions: Spain's needs a 20 % internal devaluation (or in his opinion should leave the Eurozone - I don't agree with this part). Keeping ahead of the curve, I am now starting to argue - as previewed in my latest AFOE post - that either we move soon on this, or Germany will inevitably have to go back (temporarily) to the Mark. The system won't hold otherwise. Given that opinions have changed so radically here in Spain in just six months, nothing can be ruled out at this point.
Not even Zapatero stepping down. It is interesting to note that CiU gave him till the end of the year - he will not be able to pass a budget for 2011 - to do this, or there will be elections. So let's see if the leaders of PSOE are able to "factor in" what will inevitably happen, and take a decision now.
Spain does not need elections. Spain needs a change at the top, a consensus government supported by all the main parties, and a swift internal devaluation.
Interestingly a lot of people have spoken to me here over the last few days, and all the comments have been positive. Many of the people here seem to read me in La Vaguardia (Dinero supplement) on Sundays. I never realised I was so popular, in fact I had quite the opposite impression.
Below you will find the English version of my press release. I entitled my presentation "Spain - Finland or Argentina". I think the reason for this should be fairly clear. Back in the early 1990s, following an uncontrolled credit boom, Finland underwent a deep depression as its GDP dropped by around 14% and unemployment rose dramatically from 3 to almost 20%. Initially the Finish government refused to recognise the severity of the situation, and the economy failed to recover. Then they took the “bull by the horns”, carried out a series of deep structural reforms and as a result the country is now widely recognised as a model of flexibility and good practice.
The other path is to do very little, live in hope, and expect the worst. This is the road to ruin and decay. The Argentine path.
The Finnish case was of course a little different from the situation Spain now faces, since Finland had its own currency, and was thus able to restore competitiveness through a substantial devaluation, a devaluation which then required the creation of a bad bank to relieve lenders of toxic assets produced by the rapid rise in non perforing foreign currency loans.
To many in Spain this kind of radical price and wage adjustment proposal is simply unrealistic. But at this point there are few remaining alternatives. Spain is gradually replacing Greece as the focus of global investor concern, and while people in Spain may have little appetite for such drastic changes, they should never forget that across in Germany, where people are now being asked to authorise funding for substantial loans to be used on Europe’s periphery, support for proposals that the country return to the Deutsche Mark is growing by the day. As the IMF point out, any comprehensive strategy to move the Spansih train along the track which leads to the Finland station requires broad political and social support, while time is of the essence.
Spain - Finland or Argentina?
“Spain’s economy needs far-reaching and comprehensive reforms. The challenges are severe: a dysfunctional labor market, the deflating property bubble, a large fiscal deficit, heavy private sector and external indebtedness, anemic productivity growth, weak competitiveness, and a banking sector with pockets of weakness. Ambitious fiscal consolidation is underway, recently reinforced and front-loaded. This needs to be complemented with growth-enhancing structural reforms, building on the progress made on product markets and the housing sector, especially overhauling the labor market. A bold pension reform, along the lines proposed by the government, should be quickly adopted. Consolidation and reform of the banking system needs to be accelerated. Such a comprehensive strategy would be helped by broad political and social support, and time is of the essence”.
IMF 2010 Article IV Consultation Spain Mission Statement
Following a decade long housing “boom” Spain now has an enormous debt problem. The combined debt level of Spain’s households, companies and government now amounts to some 265% of GDP.
However, in contrast to the situation in countries like Greece and Italy, Spain’s endebtedness problem is not principally one of massive public sector debt. The main component of Spanish debt is private – between households and companies accumulated debt amounts to some 210% of GDP.
Spain is not, by a long stretch, the only country to suffer from such a high level of private indebtedness. There is, for instance, the example of the United States, where total indebtedness now significantly exceeds the 300% of GDP level, a threshold which many consider to be highly structurally significant. The sheer fact of knowing you share this problem with other larger, and richer, countries may be soothing, but it should also give an indication of the kinds of difficulty Spain may experience in interacting with the external environment, since solutions will need to be found which fit the needs not of one isolated country, but of various countries, all at one and the same time.
Stabilisation....But At A Price
After an extremely severe recession the Spanish economy has now been stabilised.
Industrial output has stopped falling, and retail sales have even started to rise slightly.
Output in the bloated construction sector, as was to be expected, continues to fall, as do house prices. Unemployment has stopped rising, although employment, and participation in the Social Security system continues to fall.
At the same time the previously large migration flows have now all but dried up.
But this stabilisation comes at a price, given that is the result of a dramatic surge in current government spending and a huge liquidity support operation for the financial system being supplied by the ECB.
Deficit and Debt Dynamics
As is by now well known, this increase in public spending has produced a further problem – one of a large government fiscal deficit – and this development has served to attract the attention of the international investors on whom Spain depends for its financing at precisely the time that the issue of sovereign debt in the ageing societies of the economically developed world is starting to become a cause for concern in the financial markets.
The principal difficulty facing the Spanish economy at the present time is that while the emergency measures have served to buy time, this time has not been wisely employed, and the measures have simply served to exaccerbate the underlying structural problems rather than resolve them.
According to the National Statistics Office (INE), the slight economic expansion that was achieved in the first quarter of 2010 (0.1% growth) was the combined result of an increase in internal demand and a worsening of the net impact of external demand – precisely the opposite of what you would want to achieve. In other words, while Spain’s exports did increase, the growth in domestic demand in conditions of limited international competitiveness meant that imports increased even more. On an interannual basis the negative impact of national demand reduced (from -5.3 percentage points to -2.5 percentage points – see chart below) while the positive impact of external demand fell (from 2.2 percentage points to 1.2 percentage points). To be clear, growth in the first quarter of 2010 was due to rising domestic demand, and not rising exports, which means the real impact of the increase in government spending and the liquidity measures applied by the ECB since June 2009 has been to reverse the positive trend in the goods trade deficit which had been seen in earlier quarters.
As the Spanish government stresses, the country’s share in world exports has remained more or less constant since the start of the century, but at the same time Spain’s share of world imports has increased. Put another way, thanks to the foreign funds which flowed in to finance the housing boom Spain became a major imports powerhouse, with the consequence that both the trade and the current account deficits deteriorated sharply, while a significant part of Spanish industry simple died. One of the major tasks of any recovery programme is to bring this industry back to life. In this sense what Spain’s economy needs is not rejuvenation but resurrection.
With a highly integrated global economy as the background, Spain’s seemingly insatiable demand to build and buy ever more housing units was satisfied via the massive entry of migrant labour (5 million immigrants in 10 years), and substantial ongoing capital inflows (a current account deficit of around 10% of GDP), which both served to raise the short term capacity of the economy, but lead to the consequence that Spain today is a highly over-indebted country – net external debt is around 90% of GDP – while a large part of the manufacturing base which would have facilitated paying down the debt now no longer exists.
As a result – and as Mr Zapatero repeatedly stresses – it is the case that the accumulated debt of the Spanish government is not (yet) inordinately large when compared to that of its peers, although as a share of GDP it has been increasing rapidly in recent quarters.
To reduce this debt burden the Spanish economy needs two things: inflation and growth, although it should be stressed that competitiveness can only be restored by some form of price and wage deflation.
In a modern, mature, economy growth in aggregate demand only comes either via an increase in the level of credit, or through an increase in exports. The problem that Spain faces is that, on the one hand all sectors of the economy (households, companies and government) are now heavily over-endebted and deleveraging as fast as they can, with the result that – on aggregate – they are demanding less (not more) credit. On the other hand, the Spanish economy is not sufficiently competitive to be able to grow simply by relying on exports.
In addition, systematic dependency on external financing is never a good thing, since your creditors can always impose conditions on you which may not be to your liking. Despite the fact that the commitment to reduce Spain’s fiscal deficit by 5% of GDP in 2 years is, in and of itself, a very strong one, the country actually has to make a far greater fiscal effort than it seems, due to the commitment contained in the recent Ley de Economía Sostenible to reduce substantially the quantity of unpaid receiveables on the public sector account books. Spain’s Autonomous Communities alone have some 30 billion (or around 3% of GDP ) in payments oustanding as of the last quarter of 2010 – which means there will need to be a reduction in spending of something like a additional 1% of GDP a year over the adjustment period under this heading alone.
The need to restore order to Spain’s public finances will mean that the adjustment will be even more painful than generally envisaged, and that the impact of the correction on the economy generally will be more severe. Thus, it is rather unlikely that the Spanish economy will grow in 2011 as many expect. Weighed down by a heavy fiscal correction, an unacceptably high level of unemployment, private demand in slight contraction and a weak growth rate in exports, it is probable that the economy will once more contract, possibly by between 1% and 2%.
To conclude, Spain stands at a crossroads, and important decisions need to be taken. A fiscal adjustment is necessary, but the country also needs a competitiveness adjustment in the form of a substantial reduction in the wage and price level (possibly by 20%). If this is not implemented the dynamic of Spain’s debt will surely become unsustainable. Spain has two – and only – choices at this point. It can follow Finland’s example in the 1990s, take the bull by the horns and use the present crisis as an opportunity to transform the Spanish economy into a new economic miracle, or it can remain in denial about the severity of the problem, let things drift until they can do so no longer, and then follow Argentina down the road of ruin and despair.
To cite the words of the latest IMF report: “Such a comprehensive strategy would be helped by broad political and social support, and time is of the essence.” Ladies and gentlemen, enough is enough. Nearly three years have now been wasted, and it is time to act.
Monday, May 3, 2010
Spain's Unemployment Problem Screenshots
Please click on images for better viewing.
The links to the press release files are as follows:
March 2010
February 2010
January 2010
December 2009
November 2009
October 2009
September 2009
August 2009
July 2009
June 2009
May 2009
April 2009
March 2009
February 2009
January 2009
The links to the press release files are as follows:
March 2010
February 2010
January 2010
December 2009
November 2009
October 2009
September 2009
August 2009
July 2009
June 2009
May 2009
April 2009
March 2009
February 2009
January 2009
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